Volume 55
Issue 1 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 55,
1950-1951
10-1-1950

Parallel Trends in the Development of Sales and Quasi-Contract
Howard Newcomb Morse

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra

Recommended Citation
Howard N. Morse, Parallel Trends in the Development of Sales and Quasi-Contract, 55 DICK. L. REV. 61
(1950).
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol55/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

NOTES
PARALLEL TRENDS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
SALES AND QUASI-CONTRACT
By
E
HOWARD NEWCOMB MORSB

The cornerstone of the Law of Sales under the common law was the doctrine
of caveat emptor. I say "was" because the doctrine has been constantly whittled
down in Anglo-Amercian jurisprudence. The watering down of the doctrine
has been accomplished by both judicial decisions and legislation such as sections
13-16 of the Uniform Sales Act dealing with implied warranties. Caveat emptor
in Sales is analogous to assumption of risk in Delict. What the Uniform Sales
Act has done to the doctrine of caveat emptor is analogous to what the Workmen's Compensation Acts have done to the doctrine of assumption of risk. The
substitution of much of caveat emptor with implied warranties and of assumption
of risk with Workmen's Compensation is analogous to the superseding of the
common law contract rule that a gaming contract is void as against public policy
with the concept of insurance.
The cornerstone of the Law of Sales under the Civil Law is the doctrine of
lesion. The principal difference between caveat emptor and lesion is that the
former is the commercial ramification of laissez faire while the latter is the commercial representation of a governmentally-regimented society. The practical
result of this difference in the Law of Sales is that under the common law buyer
and seller deal at arm's length while under the Civil Law the parties occupy an
artificial fiduciary relationship toward each other. Consequently, common law
sales is more conducive to expeditions trading than its Civil Law counterpart.
This individualistic tendency of the common law and socialistic tendency of the
Civil Law is also illustrated by the treatment the two systems accord the Law
of Wills. Under the .common law a man has complete power of disposition by
will even though should he exclude his wife and children in the terms of his
will there is the rebuttable presumption of captation and suggestion, aberration of
intellect, etc. However, the doctrine of forced heirship prevails under the Civil
Law.
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Some of the leading cases cutting down caveat emptor might well be mentioned. Lord Chief Justice Holt of the Court of King's Bench in Medina v. Stoughton1
annexed a warranty of title to a sale by a vendor who was in possession. Chief
Justice Abbott of the Court of King's Bench in Gray v. Cox 2 annexed an implied
warranty that goods are reasonably adapted to ,he purpose for which they are
purchased.
Judge Finley of the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas in Norris v. Parker in
1896 made the following significant statement: ".

.

. wherever it can be shown

that the buyer relied absolutely upon his warranty and made no attempt to exercise
his own judgment in the determination of the value and quality of the goods,
the warranty will cover obvious, as well as hidden defects."' 3 Mr. Justice Hooker
of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Wallace v. L. D. Clark and Son in 1918
quoted with approval from 35 Cyc. 214 the followin g statements: "Although, in
the absence of a definite agreement as to quality, no particular quality will be implied, and the seller is not bound to furnish goods of the best quality, yet he
cannot fulfill his contract by furnishing articles of the poorest quality, but must
at least furnish articles of a fair average quality, and such as are merchantable.
The mere fact that the value of the goods is not equal to the price paid is immaterial."' 4 Mr. Chief Justice Wilson of Minnesota stated in Bekkevold v. Potts in 1927
that: "The doctrine of implied warranty should be -xtendedrather than restricted." 5
The same jurist declared in Iron Fireman Coal Stoker Ctmpany v. Brown in 1931

that: "The doctrine of implied warranty is to be liberally construed."6 And Judge
Hale of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Barrett Company v. Panther Rubber Manufacturing CompnanY in 1928 held that:

'...

where

there is a sale of a known, described, and definvd article, and if that article is in
fact supplied, there is no implied warranty of, fitness for a particular purpose.
We think the rule applies only to goods knowi', in the market and among those
familiar with that kind of trade by that descripticn." 7
Analogous to both caveat emp/or ard asswnption of risk is the quasi-contract
rule that one may not recover money paid unde" a mistake of law, first announced
by Lord Chief Justice Ellenborough of the Court of King's Bench in Bilbie v.
Lumley. 8 But just as caveat emp/or and assumption of risk both have been whittled
down so too has Lord Ellenborough's rule in the Unitud States by judicial decision
in Connecticut and Kentucky and by statute in California, 9 Montana,1 0 North
I 1 Salk. 210, 1 Ld. Raym. 593.
2
9
4
5
6
7

4 Barn. & C. 108, 115,
15 Tex. Civ. App. 117, 38 S. W. 259 (1896).
74 Old. 208, 174 P. 557, 21 A. L. R. 361 (1918).
173 Minn. 87, 216 N. W. 790, 59 A. L. R. 1164 (19127).
182 Minn. 399, 234 N. W. 685 (1931).
24 F. 2d 329 (1928).

8 2 East 469.
9 DERNG'S CAL. CIV. CODE, div. 3,part 2, tit. 1, chal . 3, §§ 1567, 1576, 1578 (1949).
10 MoNT. REv. CODES ANN., vol. 2, tit. 13, chap. 3, §§ 3, 12, 14 (1947).
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Dakota, 1 Oklahoma, 12 and South Dakota. 18 In 1849 Mr. Chief Justice Church of
Connecticut stated in Northrop's Executors v. Graves: "That a party may not
urge his ignorance of the law as an excuse or palliation of a crime, or even
of a fault, we may admit; that he may not, by reason of such ignorance, or mistake,
obtain any right or advantage over another, we may admit; but we do not admit,
that such other may obtain or secure an unjust advantage over him, by reason
of his ignorance or mistake, even of the law. We agree, that men should not complain of the consequences of their deliberate and voluntary acts; but we do not
agree, that acts performed under the influence of essential and controlling mistakes, are voluntary, within the meaning of the maxim referred to (Volenti non
fit injuria). And we say, that neither maxims of law (Ignorantia legis non
14
excusat), nor fictions of law, should be so applied, as to work manifest injustice."
In 1886 Mr. Justice Holt of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky declared
in McMurtry v. Kentucky Central Railroad Company that: ". . . in the case
now before us no question was raised at the time as to the right of the claimant
to interest; and if, in fact, he was not entitled to it, then it is manifest that it was
paid under a mistake of law, and without consideration; and not being due
either in law or conscience, the law will not allow him to retain it. This rule
is so well settled in this State that it is no longer a question whether a recovery
can be had where money has been paid, without consideration, either under a
mistake of law or fact, and which was not owing in law or conscience, nor the
result of compromise."' 6
A case involving the application of the Montana statute was Hicks v. Stillwater
County in 1928, in which Mr. Justice Matthews of the Supreme Court of Montana
held as follows: "Chapter 8, Part V (Civ. Code) Revised Codes of 1921, deals
with 'consent' as an element of contract, and among other requirements, declares
that the consent of the parties must be 'free' (§ 7473); it being not free if
obtained through mistake (§ 7475), which may be either of fact or law (§ 7484).
'Mistake of law constitutes a mistake, within the meaning of this chapter, only
when it arises from: 1. A misapprehension of the law by all parties, all supposing
that they knew and understood it, and all making substantially the same mistake
as to the law.' (§ 7486). The allegations of the complaint bring this case
squarely within these provisions, which warrant a rescission of the contract for
mutual mistake and should justify recovery herein."16
A case involving the application of the North Dakota statute was Gjerstiandengen v. Hartzell? in 1900. Another case involving the application of the North
11 N. D. REv. CODE, vol. 1, chap. 9, §§ 3, 12, 14, chap. 10, § 5 (1943).
12 OKL. STAT. ANN.,

tit.

15, chap. 1,

§§

53, 62, 64

(1937).

S. D. CODE, vol. 1, tit. I0, chap. 10, §§ 3, 11, 13 (1939).
24 19 Conn. 548, 560 (1849).
15 84 Ky. 462, 465, 1 S. W. 815 (1886).
1

16 84 Mont. 38, 49, 50, 274 P. 296, 300. 301 (1928).
17 9 N. D. 268, 83 N. W. 230 (1900).
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Dakota statute was City of Bismarck v. Burleigh County in 1922, in which Mr.

Justice Robinson of the Supreme Court of North Dakota ruled as follows: "However, the claim was presented in good faith and it was paid under a mistake
of the law, each party believing that the city was liable for the same. The payment was made under a misapprehension of the law by all parties, all supposing
that they knew and understood it and all making substantially the same mistake
as to the law. Hence, under the statute it was not a free and voluntary payment.
Section 5855. The city was under no legal or moral obligation to make the payment and its officers had no legal or moral right to donate or give away the
money of the city." 18

In the words of Sir William R. Anson, "Quasi-contract is the very field
where, as Lord Mansfield saw, the law is most rapidly expanding to include
new moral obligations as soon as they become settled in the mores of society." 19
Thus, in all probability additional states will reject the Bilbie v. Lumley rule in
accordance with the precedent first established by Connecticut one hundred
and one years ago.
is

49 N, D. 205, 206, 207, 190 N. W. 811, 812 (1922).
18 ANSON ON CONTRACT, N. Y., 1930, Oxford Univ. Press, p. 596.

